This study shows that analysts vary significantly in their responsiveness to earnings announcements, where responsiveness is defined as promptness of analysts' first forecast revisions for the next quarter since the prior quarterly earnings announcements. Further evidence indicates that analysts' responsiveness improves the efficiency of their expectations of future earnings immediately after the earnings announcements, which in turn mitigates the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift. The results provide direct support for the "delayed response" hypothesis that prior research proposes to explain market underreactions.
Introduction
This study seeks to examine (i) how responsive sell-side security analysts (hereafter, "analysts") are to quarterly earnings announcements in revising their forecasts for future earnings and (ii) whether their responsiveness is associated with the extent to which they, as well as the market, underreact to earnings announcements.
Stylized valuation models frequently posit that stock price is a function of expected (permanent) earnings based on available information. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that upon receiving new information, investors instantaneously adjust their expectations of earnings, which is in turn reflected instantaneously in stock prices. However, researchers have been able to document evidence inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. One of the most persistent anomalies is the post-earningsannouncement drift, where stock prices continue to drift for a long period after the earnings announcements. Since the phenomenon was first reported by Ball and Brown (1968) , it has survived robustness checks, including extension to more recent data (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996; Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 2003) .
As Fama (1998) puts it, the post-earnings-announcement drift is an anomaly that is "above suspicion."
A number of studies have attempted to explain the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Bernard and Thomas (1989) suggest that the "delayed response" hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the drift than the "risk premium" hypothesis. Hong and Stein (1999) propose that market underreacts because private information diffuses gradually across investors.
1 In explaining why the market underreacts to public information such as earnings announcements, Hong and Stein suggest that although the news itself is public, it might require some other, private, information to convert this news into a judgment about value, thus the "gradual information diffusion" explanation continues to apply. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) propose a model of investor sentiment to explain market under-and overreaction. Their model is based on literature on the psychology of decision making. In particular, they suggest that market underreaction is consistent with a phenomenon documented in psychology, namely conservatism, defined as the slow updating of models in the face of new information.
While these papers have different perspectives in explaining market underreaction, one common and important implication of their explanations is that investors are slow in adjusting their expectations for future earnings upon receiving new information, which I generally refer to as the "delayed response" hypothesis. Few studies, however, have directly tested this hypothesis by focusing on the speed at which investors adjust their expectations after news releases.
This study seeks to directly test the "delayed response" hypothesis. Specifically, I
examine the responsiveness of analyst forecast revisions after quarterly earnings announcements. I focus on analysts because general investors' earnings expectations are not directly observable. On the other hand, one of analysts' major responsibilities is to issue earnings forecasts to guide the general investors, and their forecasts have significant influence on investors (Schipper 1991).
2
I define analysts' responsiveness as the promptness of their first forecast revisions for the next quarter after the prior quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with the "delayed response" hypothesis, I find that, based on analyst-firm-quarter specific observations, about 44% of analysts (hereafter, "responsive analysts") issue forecast revisions within two trading days after the earnings announcement, whereas the average number of calendar days between the earnings announcements and the first forecast revisions is thirty-four days for the other 56% of analysts (hereafter, "non-responsive analysts"). Additional analysis shows that relative to those for the responsive analysts, the absolute forecast errors are in fact significantly larger for the non-responsive analysts, suggesting their lack of prompt responses is not because the earnings announcements convey relatively less new information with respect to their prior information set. This also suggests that the responsive analysts' forecasts are more accurate. Further, the responsive analysts not only react more promptly, but also more completely to the earnings announcements-their first forecast revisions have higher correlations with the earning surprises than do those of the non-responsive analysts.
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) examine whether the post-earnings-announcement drift can be explained by analysts' underreaction to earnings announcements and find supporting evidence that analyst forecast errors exhibit positive serial correlations.
Accordingly, to investigate the effect of analysts' responsiveness on the extent of market underreaction, I first examine its effect on the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors two 2 It is not uncommon that researchers use analyst forecasts to proxy for market expectations (e.g., Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman 2002; Liang 2003) . Fried and Givoly (1982) suggest that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series models.
trading days after the earnings announcements, the starting point of my measure of the postearnings-announcement drift. While both responsive and non-responsive analysts appear to underreact to earnings announcements, responsive analysts underreact to a significantly lesser extent. In fact, the serial correlation in their forecast errors is less than half of that in nonresponsive analysts' forecast errors. This result also holds at the firm level with mean forecast errors, where the firm-level analysts' responsiveness is measured by the percentage of responsive analysts following the firm.
Finally, I investigate the effects of analysts' responsiveness on the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift. I find that the drift is significantly lower when the percentage of responsive analysts following the firm is higher. Specifically, over the sixtytrading-day period starting from the third trading day after the earnings announcements, the drift is about one third lower for firms followed by responsive analysts only than firms followed by non-responsive analysts only.
In sum, the results of this study show that a majority of analysts are not responsive to earnings announcements in revising their forecasts for future earnings. Further, analysts vary significantly in their responsiveness (and completeness) in incorporating information in earnings announcements into their forecast revisions. Most importantly, the difference in responsiveness affects the efficiency of their expectations, and hence the efficiency of market expectations, of future earnings immediately after the earnings announcement, which in turn affects the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Thus, this study provides direct support for the "delayed response" hypothesis for the post-earnings-announcement drift discussed above. It suggests that the speed at which market participants incorporate new information into their forecasts for future earnings and into stock prices is indeed associated with the extent of market underreaction. As suggested by Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 examines the timing and magnitude of analysts' responses to earnings announcements. Section 4 examines the effects of analysts' responsiveness on their underreaction to the earnings announcements, and on the post-earnings-announcement drift. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
I focus on analysts' forecast revision for the next quarter after the current quarterly earnings announcement, since prior studies (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1990) suggest that the post-earnings-announcement drift is caused by investors' failure to recognize the autocorrelation structure of quarterly earnings. I obtain analyst forecast revision and earnings announcement data from I/B/E/S detail file 3 and stock return and price data from CRSP. As discussed below, I also use information from I/B/E/S identification file and adjustment file to make certain adjustments. A couple of econometric issues warrant discussion before I move on to the empirical evidence. To correct for the autocorrelation and generalized conditional heteroskedasticity embedded in the sample, the t-statistics in the regressions are adjusted using generalized method of moments (GMM) as described in Newey and West (1987) with six lags. To minimize the effects of outliers, I delete observations with extreme forecast errors as described in the sample selection process. In addition, all regressions reported in the tables are estimated after deleting observations with absolute studentised residuals greater than 2 (e.g., see SAS 1989).
How Responsive are Analysts to Earnings Announcements?

Timing of Analyst Forecast Revisions
In light of the stylized model discussed at the beginning of the paper, the efficient market hypothesis predicts that upon receiving new information, rational investors instantaneously update their expectations for future earnings. However, while new information may become available to the market everyday, analysts do not necessarily revise and publish their forecasts everyday. Their revision activities potentially depend on the extent to which the new information alters their expectations for future earnings.
Bagnoli, Levine, and Watts (2004) find that among various corporate information events, analyst forecast revisions tend to cluster to a greater extent after earnings announcements than after earnings guidance or other events. They argue that this is because the earnings announcements deliver news in a clear and relatively consistent format at predictable times and consist largely of financial information prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. They also argue that earnings announcements may induce more analyst forecast revisions because of the directness of the link between earnings and firm valuation. In addition, as Francis et al. (2002) document, there is a growing tendency for managers to include additional, significant information in an earnings release such as income statement line items, balance sheets, cash flow information, and forecasts. This additional information also helps analysts in revising their forecasts for future earnings.
Thus, given the significant implications of earnings announcements for future earnings as well as for firm values, although analysts do not necessarily revise their forecasts each time they receive new information, they are more likely to do so after the earnings announcements than after other corporate information events. Consistent with Bagnoli et al. (2004 ), Stickel (1989 finds that analysts avoid revising for two weeks before an earnings announcement and more frequently revise immediately after the announcement. Similarly, Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that analysts' forecast revisions concentrate on the days immediately after the earnings announcements. However, unlike the current study, none of the above studies is specifically interested in the effects of analysts' responsiveness on market underreaction.
To examine analysts' responsiveness to earnings announcements, I first present distributions of the number of calendar days from the earnings announcement of quarter t to the analyst's first forecast revision for quarter t+1 since. Panel A of Table 2 shows that inconsistent with the prediction that analysts instantaneously adjust their expectations upon the earnings announcements, on average it takes 20 days before an analyst revises her forecast.
The median is 7 days. The first and third quartiles are 2 and 31 days respectively, whereas the standard deviation is 25 days. The distribution is very similar after I delete observations with zero analyst-specific forecast error where the earnings announcement potentially conveys minimal information to the analyst. I formerly measure an analyst's responsiveness by RESP i,j,t , which equals 1 if she issues a forecast revision within two trading days after the earnings announcement (i.e., the event window is from trading day 0 to trading day 2), and 0 otherwise. To the extent that one expects stock prices to have reflected the information immediately after the event, one would also expect investors to have processed the information and revised their expectations for future earnings by the same time. Event studies typically use one or two trading days after the event as the end of the event window. I choose two trading days to allow for the possibility that analysts may need more time to convert the information in earnings announcement into a formal forecast for future earnings or they may need more time to acquire additional information from the firm.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that only 43.67% of analysts revise their quarter t+1
forecasts during the event window (i.e., RESP i,j,t =1 Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find frequency of responsive revisions similar to that reported in the current study when they examine only the first forecast revisions by the analysts since the earnings announcements.
following the firm. In contrast, 46% of firm-quarters have no responsive analysts following at all.
Overall, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest considerable variations in analysts' responsiveness and more importantly, they suggest a majority of analysts, despite their expertise, do not adjust their expectations instantaneously after earnings announcements which potentially provide significant, new information. This evidence is consistent with the "delayed response" explanation for the post-earnings-announcement drift, raising questions regarding the efficiency of the analyst forecasts as well as the efficiency of the market.
I next examine certain analyst-specific or firm-specific variables conditional on analysts' responsiveness. Table 3 shows that while mean and median number of calendar days from firms' announcing E j,t to analysts' issuing F i,j,t+1 b are only 2.50 and 2 respectively for responsive analysts, they are as high as 34 and 27 days respectively for non-responsive analysts. 7 The next variable of interest is AFE i,j,t , the absolute value of FE i,j,t , which reflects the amount of new information the earnings announcement conveys to the analyst with respect to her prior information set reflected in F i,j,t . One would expect higher probability for the analyst to react immediately to the earnings announcement with higher AFE i,j,t .
In contrast to this expectation, responsive analysts' forecasts are in fact more accurate than non-responsive analysts, for both means and medians. Similarly, the absolute value of forecast error for quarter t+1 before the quarter t earnings announcement, calculated as
)/P, is also significantly lower for responsive analysts than for 7 The average number of calendar days between fiscal period end and the first forecast revision by the nonresponsive analysts is 59 days and the median is 53 days. Thus, considering that the SEC requires firms to file 10-Q forms within 45 calendar days after the fiscal period end, it is unlikely the lack of prompt reaction by nonresponsive analysts is completely driven by the need for additional, comprehensive information from the 10-Q forms.
non-responsive analysts. These results suggest that the lack of reactions by the non-responsive analysts are not because the earnings announcements convey less information with respect to their prior information set or they have relative information advantage over the responsive analysts before the earnings announcements. 8 Further, AFE i,j,t+1 b , the counterpart of AFE i,j,t+1 a after the earnings announcements, is significantly lower for responsive analysts than for nonresponsive analysts. This suggests that the first forecasts of the responsive analysts since the earnings announcements are more accurate than those of the non-responsive analysts, even though on average the non-responsive analysts issue forecast revisions almost one month after the earnings announcements, and potentially have access to additional information during this period.
The results regarding the absolute forecast errors so far suggest that the lack of prompt reaction by non-responsive analysts is not driven by less new information contained in the earnings announcements relative to their prior information set. Instead, the results seem to suggest that non-responsive analysts generally have lower ability to forecast earnings accurately. This raises the possibility that non-responsive analysts' forecasts are of lower quality (e.g., Cooper et al. 2001) and that their lack of prompt reaction is due to their lower ability to understand the implications of current earnings for future earnings.
I also examine the signed forecast errors, FE i,j,t , conditional on analysts'
responsiveness. The evidence reported in Table 3 suggests that analysts are more likely to revise their forecasts promptly when the earnings announcements convey "good news." The average forecast error is 0.0002 for responsive analysts but -0.0004 for non-responsive analysts. This is consistent with Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) that the market seems to underreact more to "bad news"-"bad news travels slowly." Untabulated results show that 34% of the non-responsive analyst-firm-quarters have negative earnings surprises, versus 27%
of the responsive analyst-firm-quarters.
Another analyst-specific variable reported in Table 3 is analysts' firm-specific experience. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) suggest that analysts' forecast accuracy improves as they gain firm-specific experience. In addition, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2003a) find that analysts with longer firm-specific experience underreact to prior information to a lesser extent. Accordingly, I next examine EXP i,j,t , measured as the number of quarters that the analyst has followed the firm by quarter t. Consistent with these studies, on average, responsive analysts have 9-quarter firm-specific experience, longer than the 8-quarter firmspecific experience of the non-responsive analysts. The difference is statistically significant.
Finally, I examine three firm-specific variables including age, market capitalization, and analyst coverage. Prior studies suggest that firms with older age have lower information uncertainty and lower price momentum (Jiang, Lee, and Zhang 2004) , and that the market incorporates information more efficiently for larger firms and firms with greater analyst coverage (e.g., Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer 2001; Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin 1984; Hong et al. 2000) . To the extent that analysts' responsiveness is associated with the information efficiency of the firm, one would expect that firms followed by responsive analysts are older, larger, and followed by more analysts. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that consistent with expectations, firms followed by responsive analysts have significantly higher analyst coverage (NUMANA j,t ) and larger market capitalization (LOGMV j,t ) than those followed by non-responsive analysts. 9 However, analysts seem to be more responsive to younger firms as opposed to older firms (AGE j,t ).
Magnitude of Analyst Forecast Revisions
The previous subsection examines how promptly analysts revise their earnings forecasts for the next quarter. In this subsection, I focus on the extent to which analysts incorporate the news in the earnings announcements to their forecast revisions. Prior studies suggest that market reactions to earnings announcements are correlated with the "surprises" or new information contained in the announcements (e.g., Fried and Givoly 1982) . To the extent that market reactions reflect investors' revisions of expectations of future earnings, one would expect that analysts' forecast revisions are also correlated with the earnings surprises.
Consistent with this, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts forecast revisions are correlated with their previous forecast errors. However, the measure of forecast revisions in their study is relatively "stale," as it is based on the changes of analysts' consensus forecasts from eight months before to four months after the earnings announcements.
In the context of the current study, I am specifically interested in the effects of quarter t earnings surprises on analysts' forecast revisions for quarter t+1, and in particular, whether the magnitude of this effect varies with analysts' responsiveness. If an analyst responds more promptly after an earnings announcement in revising her forecast for future earnings, it is probably because she understands better the implications of current earnings for future earnings, as discussed in the previous subsection. Thus, her responsiveness is expected to be indicative of the extent to which she incorporates the information into her forecasts revision.
The forecast revision REV i,j,t+1 is as defined in Table 1 . I use FE i,j,t , the analystspecific forecast error for quarter t, to measure the news in the earnings announcements to the analyst, since different analysts may have different information set and probably an analyst's individual information set is best reflected in her own forecast. I investigate the relation between forecast revisions and the news in the earnings announcements by estimating the following model:
I start the analysis by estimating a base model which simply regresses REV i,j,t+1 on Table 4 report this regression estimated for responsive analysts and non-responsive analysts separately. For responsive analysts, the coefficient on FE i.j,t is significant at 0.528, and the R-squared is 28.93%. In contrast, the coefficient is only 0.457 and R-squared 22.44% for non-responsive analysts.
To test the statistical significance of the difference in the coefficient on FE i,j,t , I next include an interaction term between FE i,j,t and RESP i,j,t , allowing FE i,j,t to have different coefficients conditional on analysts' responsiveness. The results are reported in Column (4).
The interaction term has a significantly positive coefficient of 0.071, suggesting the difference between the extent to which responsive and non-responsive analysts incorporate the news into their revisions is statistically significant.
Finally, I estimate the complete version of model (1) which controls for the effects of the analyst's firm-specific experience and the firm's analyst coverage on the correlation between REV i,j,t+1 and FE i,j,t . It is necessary to include these control variables because Table 3 shows that analysts' responsiveness are correlated with these two variables and prior studies suggest these variables are associated with the information efficiency of the security market Table 4 , show that RESP i,j,t continues to have a significantly positive, albeit somewhat smaller, effect on the relation between analysts' forecast revisions and earnings surprises, suggesting that this effect is not subsumed by firm-specific experience or analyst coverage. On the other hand, EXP i,j,t has an insignificant effect, while NUMANA j,t has a significantly positive effect as expected.
Does Analysts' Responsiveness Affect Market Underreaction?
Analysts' Responsiveness and Analysts' Underreaction
In this Section, I explicitly test whether delayed analysts' response (i.e., lack of analysts' responsiveness) contributes to market underreaction. I start by examining whether analysts' responsiveness mitigates analysts' underreaction to the earnings announcements, where analysts' underreaction is measured by the serial correlation in their forecast errors.
The results in Section 3 suggest that in comparison to those of non-responsive analysts, responsive analysts' forecast revisions are associated with new information in earnings announcements to a greater extent. However, this result per se does not necessarily imply that the responsive analysts underreact to a lesser extent than do non-responsive analysts. As
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) point out, to test whether analysts systematically underreact (or overreact) to news in earnings announcements about future earnings, one needs to benchmark analysts' reactions against the true earnings innovation series. To achieve this, one needs to examine the autocorrelation in analysts' forecasts errors. If the analyst fully understands the implications of current earnings surprise for future earnings and instantaneously adjusts her forecast for future earnings accordingly, her forecast errors should not be autocorrelated.
A number of studies find that analysts' forecast errors are correlated with prior information, suggesting they underreact to that information. I incorporate the timeliness perspective by focusing on the extent of analysts' underreaction immediately after the earnings announcements. I measure analysts' expectations of future earnings immediately after the earnings announcements using F i,j,t+1 , their forecasts outstanding at the end of the second trading day after the announcements.
Specifically, F i,j,t+1 equals to F i,j,t+1 b for responsive analysts and F i,j,t+1 a for non-responsive analysts. Since non-responsive analysts have not updated their forecasts, their latest forecasts prior to the earnings announcements are still considered valid. I examine the autocorrelation in analyst forecast errors using the following model:
where FE i,j,t+1 =(E j,t+1 -F i,j,t+1 )/P. Other variables are as defined previously.
As in Section 3.2, I first estimate a base model which regresses FE i,j,t+1 on FE i,j,t . The coefficient on FE i,j,t is 0.82, indicating significant underreaction, on average, by analysts at the end of second trading day after the earnings announcements. Prior studies that use the latest analyst forecasts before the next quarter's earnings announcements typically report a coefficient around 0.15. 11 The decrease in the serial correlation from immediately after quarter t's earnings announcements to immediately before quarter t+1's earnings announcements suggests that analysts only slowly incorporate implications of current earnings for future earnings into their forecasts over time, again consistent with the "delayed response" explanation for market underreactions.
A more striking result emerges when I estimate the model for the two types of analysts separately. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5 show that for non-responsive analysts, the autocorrelation is as high as 0.844, while for responsive analysts, it is only 0.369, less than half of that for non-responsive analysts. The R-squared is also in sharp contrast: it is almost 21% for non-responsive analysts, more than double that for responsive analysts (8.61%). This result suggests that the responsive analysts' prompt forecast revisions significantly mitigate the correlation of their forecast errors immediately after the earnings announcements.
I next estimate the model after adding the interaction terms of FE i,j,t with RESP i,j,t , and subsequently, the interaction terms of FE i,j,t with EXP i,j,t and NUMANA j,t respectively. The results appear in the last two columns in Table 5 . Consistent with expectations, the coefficient on the interaction term of FE i,j,t and RESP i,j,t is significantly negative, with or without the control variables. When the model controls for the effects of analysts' firm-specific experience and analysts' coverage, non-responsive analysts' forecast errors have a serial correlation of 0.809, in comparison to 0.327 (=0.809-0.482) for responsive analysts. In other words, immediately (i.e., two trading days) after the earnings announcements, the serial correlation in forecast errors for responsive analysts' is only 40% of that for non-responsive analysts, suggesting responsive analysts' forecasts better incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Regarding the control variables, inconsistent with Mikhail et al. (2003a) , the coefficient on FE i,j,t × EXP i,j,t is significantly positive. 12 In addition, the effect of NUMANA j,t on the degree of underreaction is negative, albeit insignificant.
The above analyses are performed at the analyst level; that is, the unit of observation is analyst-firm-quarter specific. Since the post-earnings-announcement drift is necessarily examined at the firm level, I also repeat the analyses above using firm level data. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
where MFE j,t is the firm-quarter mean of FE i,j,t (MFE j,t+1 is calculated likewise). Following Mikhail et al. (2003b) , FEXP j,t is the firm-quarter median of EXP i,j,t , where EXP i,j,t is as defined previously. FRESP j,t and NUMANA j,t are as defined previously.
The results, presented in Panel B of Table 5 , are generally consistent with those reported in Panel A. In Column (1), before the inclusion of the interaction terms, MFE j,t has a positive coefficient of 0.722 for the pooled sample. In Columns (2) and (3), without or with control variables respectively, the coefficient on the interaction term of MFE j,t and FRESP j,t is significantly negative. The results suggest that at the firm level, the autocorrelation in mean analyst forecast errors after the earnings announcements decreases as the percentage of responsive analysts following the firm increases. In fact, based on Column (3), for firms 12 There are at least two differences in sample selection and research design between the Mikhail et al. paper and the current paper. First, Mikhail et al. use analyst forecast information from Zacks while I use analyst forecast information from I/B/E/S. Second, they measure the serial correlation in analyst forecast errors immediately before the next quarter's earnings announcements while I measure the serial correlation immediately after current quarter's earnings announcements.
followed by responsive analysts only, the autocorrelation in analyst forecast errors is only 42% of that for firms followed by non-responsive analysts only. Finally, the effect of experience on the autocorrelation at the firm level is insignificantly positive, and the effect of analyst coverage is significantly positive.
Analysts' Responsiveness and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift
The results presented in the previous subsection indicate that in comparison to nonresponsive analysts, responsive analysts underreact to earnings announcements to a lesser extent. In other words, their forecasts at the end of two trading days after the earnings announcements better reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. To the extent that analyst forecasts mirror market expectations for future earnings and that the postearnings-announcement drift is caused by investors' failure to promptly incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings into stock prices (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1990), this result implies that the post-earnings-announcement drift would be lower for firms followed by responsive analysts. I now explicitly test this prediction.
To be consistent with my definition of the event window, the post-earningsannouncement period starts from the third trading after the earnings announcements.
Following prior studies (e.g., Liang 2003; Mikhail et al. 2003b ), I focus on stock returns over the sixty-trading-day period after the earnings announcements and measure stock returns over this period using size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (SAR j,t ), where the adjustment is based on equally-weighted returns of NYSE / AMEX / NASDAQ firm size decile to which the firm belongs at the beginning of the calendar year.
I estimate the following regression to examine the effect of analysts' responsiveness on the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift.
SAR j,t = β 0 + β 1 RMFE j,t + β 2 RMFE j,t × FRESP j,t + β 3 FRESP j,t + β 4 MFE j,t × FEXP j,t + β 5 FEXP j,t + β 6 MFE j,t × NUMANA j,t + β 7 NUMANA j,t
To minimize problems associated with outliers as well as non-linearity, I follow prior literature to use deciles of MFE j,t , namely, RMFE j,t , as opposed the raw MFE j,t , in the regression (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1990; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000; Doyle et al. 2003) . Specifically, I rank MFE j,t by fiscal quarters into ten deciles indexed from 0 to 9 and then divide the index by 9 so that RMFE j,t , the ranked surprise, ranges between 0 and 1.
Thus, the coefficient on RMFE j,t can be readily interpreted as the size-adjusted return one can earn by taking a long position in the highest decile and a short positive in the lowest decile.
Other variables are as defined in the previous sections.
The results are presented in Table 6 . Column (1) reports the pooled regression with the base model which regresses SAR j,t on RMFE j,t . The coefficient on RMFE j,t is 0.048, indicating that on average, one can earn about 4.8% size-adjusted return during the sixty trading days after the earnings announcements by taking the "post-earnings-announcement trading strategy" with the sample used in this paper. The next column allows the coefficient on RMFE j,t to vary with the percentage of responsive analysts that follow the firm. The coefficient on RMFE j,t is significantly positive at 0.055, whereas that on RMFE j,t × FRESP j,t is significantly negative at -0.022. This suggests that for firms that are followed by responsive analysts only, the post-earnings-announcement drift is about 40% lower than for firms that are followed by non-responsive analysts only.
The last column confirms that this result is not subsumed by the effects of analysts' firm-specific experience or analyst coverage. The results suggest that after controlling for these effects, while the drift for firms that are followed by non-responsive analysts only can be as high as 6.2%, it is more than one third lower if all analysts who follow the firm are responsive to the earnings announcements in revising their forecasts. In terms of the control variables, unlike the results presented in previous sections regarding EXP i,j,t or FEXP j,t , here FEXP j,t has a significantly negative effect on the magnitude of the post-earningsannouncement drift, consistent with the results in Mikhail et al. (2003b) . Similarly, NUMANA j,t also has a significantly negative effect, suggesting that the post-earningsannouncement drift is smaller when the firm has a greater number of analysts following.
In sum, the results in Table 6 show that the post-earnings-announcement drift decreases as the percentage of responsive analysts following the firm increases. This finding supports the hypothesis that delayed responses by investors and/or analysts contribute to the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Conclusion
Recently, a number of studies provide behavioral explanations for market underreactions or overreactions. A common view of the behavioral explanations for underreaction anomalies such as post-earnings-announcement drift proposes that investors are slow in updating their expectations upon receiving information, i.e., the "delayed response"
hypothesis. Few studies, however, have provided direct evidence to support this view.
This study addresses this issue by focusing specifically on the speed at which analysts respond to quarterly earnings announcements in revising their earnings forecasts for future quarters. To directly test the validity of the "delayed response" hypothesis as an explanation for market underreaction, I also examine the effects of analysts' responsiveness on market underreaction to earnings announcements. The results show that more than half of analysts do not react to earnings surprises instantaneously as the efficient market hypothesis predicts.
Further, analysts' responsiveness mitigates both the extent of the positive serial correlation in analyst forecast errors after the earnings announcements and the extent of the post-earningsannouncement drift. Together, these results provide direct support for the "delayed response"
hypothesis and suggest it is indeed possible that investors' cognitive incompetence leads to underreaction anomalies such as the post-earnings-announcement drift.
Given the sophistication levels of security analysts, it is somewhat surprising that a considerable number of analysts do not promptly adjust their earnings expectations upon the earnings announcements. Additional analyses in this study suggest that the lack of prompt reaction by the non-responsive analysts is not because they have information advantage over the responsive analysts. On the contrary, they seem to in general have lower ability to forecast accurately and to understand the implications of current earnings for future earnings. This result sheds light on the importance to examining the responsiveness aspect of analysts information processing, suggesting that analysts' responsiveness can potentially be a good indicator of their overall forecasting abilities. Future work could investigate economic factors as well as behavioral factors that drive analysts' responsiveness. F i,j,t is analyst i's most recent forecast for firm j quarter t before the corresponding earnings announcement. F i,j,t+1 a is analyst i's most recent forecast for firm j quarter t+1 issued before the announcement of E j,t . F i,j,t+1 b is analyst i's first forecast for firm j quarter t+1 issued after the announcement of E j,t . E j,t+1 is the actual earnings per share for firm j quarter t+1.
Latest Forecast for Quarter t: The sample includes 327,084 analyst-firm-quarters with fiscal period ending between 1988 and 2002, representing 103,681 firm-quarters. FE i,j,t =( E j,t -F i,j,t )/P and REV i,j,t+1 =(F i,j,t+1 b -F i,j,t+1 a )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t. See Figure 1 for timeline and definitions of E j,t , F i,j,t , F i,j,t+1 b , and F i,j,t+1 a .
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Table 2. Analysts' Responsiveness to Earnings Announcements
The sample includes 327,084 analyst-firm-quarters with fiscal period ending between 1988 and 2002, representing 103,681 firm-quarters. FE i,j,t =( E j,t -F i,j,t )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t. RESP i,j,t equals 1 if F i,j,t+1 b is issued within two trading days after the announcement of E j,t and 0 otherwise. FRESP j,t is the percentage of analysts with RESP i,j,t =1 among all analysts following firm j for the quarter t. See Figure 1 for timeline and definitions of E j,t , F i,j,t , F i,j,t+1 a , and F i,j,t+1 b . Industries are classified in accordance to Fama and French (1997 a )/P, and AFE i,j,t+1 b =Abs(E j,t+1 -F i,j,t+1 b )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t. RESP i,j,t equals 1 if F i,j,t+1 b is issued within two trading days after the announcement of E j,t and 0 otherwise. EXP i,j,t is the number of quarters that analyst i has been following firm j by quarter t. AGE j,t is the number of years firm j has been included in the CRSP database as of the end of quarter t. LOGMV j,t is the log of market value of firm j as of the end of quarter t. NUMANA j,t is the number of analysts following firm j for quarter t. See Figure 1 The sample includes 327,084 analyst-firm-quarters with fiscal period ending between 1988 and 2002, representing 103,681 firm-quarters. FE i,j,t = (E j,t -F i,j,t )/P and REV i,j,t+1 =(F i,j,t+1 b -F i,j,t+1 a )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t. RESP i,j,t equals 1 if F i,j,t+1 b is issued within two trading days after the announcement of E j,t and 0 otherwise. EXP i,j,t is the number of quarters that analyst i has been following firm j by quarter t. NUMANA j,t is the number of analysts following firm j for quarter t. See Figure 1 for timeline and definitions of E j,t , F i,j,t , F i,j,t+1 a , and F i,j,t+1 b . All regressions are estimated after deleting observations with absolute studentised residuals greater than 2. Numbers in parentheses are two-sided p-values. They are based on t-statistics adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with six lags. REV i,j,t+1 = β 0 + β 1 FE i,j,t + β 2 FE i,j,t × RESP i,j,t + β 3 RESP i,j,t + β 4 FE i,j,t × EXP i,j,t + β 5 EXP i,j,t + β 6 FE i,j,t × NUMANA j,t + β 7 NUMANA j,t
Predicted Sign
(1) Pooled (2) The sample includes 327,084 analyst-firm-quarters with fiscal period ending between 1988 and 2002, representing 103,681 firm-quarters. FE i,j,t = (E j,t -F i,j,t )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t. RESP i,j,t equals 1 if F i,j,t+1 b is issued within two trading days after the announcement of E j,t and 0 otherwise. FE i,j,t+1 = (E j,t+1 -F i,j,t+1 )/P, where F i,j,t+1 equals F i,j,t+1 b if RESP i,j,t equals 1 and F i,j,t+1 a otherwise. EXP i,j,t is the number of quarters that analyst i has been following firm j by quarter t. NUMANA j,t is the number of analysts following firm j for quarter t. MFE j,t and MFE j,t+1 are firmquarter means of FE i,j,t and FE i,j,t+1 respectively. FRESP j,t is the percentage of analysts with RESP i,j,t =1 among all analysts following firm j for the quarter t. FEXP j,t is median of EXP i,j,t for firm j quarter t. See Figure 1 for timeline and definitions of E j,t , E j,t+1 , F i,j,t , F i,j,t+1 a , and F i,j,t+1 b . All regressions are estimated after deleting observations with absolute studentised residuals greater than 2. Numbers in parentheses are two-sided p-values. They are based on t-statistics adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with six lags.
Panel A: Analyst Level Analysis FE i,j,t+1 = β 0 + β 1 FE i,j,t + β 2 FE i,j,t × RESP i,j,t + β 3 RESP i,j,t + β 4 FE i,j,t × EXP i,j,t + β 5 EXP i,j,t + β 6 FE i,j,t × NUMANA j,t + β 7 NUMANA j,t
(1) Pooled The sample includes 327,084 analyst-firm-quarters with fiscal period ending between 1988 and 2002, representing 103,681 firm-quarters. SAR j,t is size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over sixty trading days since the 3rd trading day after the earnings announcement of firm j for quarter t. FE i,j,t = (E j,t -F i,j,t )/P, where P is firm j's stock price at the end of fiscal quarter t.
RMEF t is the decile of MFE t ranked by quarter and ranges from 0 to 1, where MFE j,t is firm-quarter means of FE i,j,t . FRESP j,t is the percentage of analysts with RESP i,j,t =1 among all analysts following firm j for the quarter t, where RESP i,j,t equals 1 if F i,j,t+1 b is issued within two trading days after the announcement of E j,t and 0 otherwise. FEXP j,t is median of EXP i,j,t for firm j quarter t, where EXP i,j,t is the number of quarters that analyst i has been following firm j by quarter t. NUMANA j,t is the number of analysts following firm j for quarter t. See Figure 1 for timeline and definitions of E j,t , F i,j,t , F i,j,t+1 b , and F i,j,t+1 a . All regressions are estimated after deleting observations with absolute studentised residuals greater than 2. Numbers in parentheses are two-sided p-values. They are based on t-statistics adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with six lags. SAR j,t = β 0 + β 1 RMFE j,t + β 2 RMFE j,t × FRESP j,t + β 3 FRESP j,t + β 4 MFE j,t × FEXP j,t + β 5 FEXP j,t + β 6 MFE j,t × NUMANA j,t + β 7 NUMANA j,t
(1) Pooled (2) 
